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A Preview of the Commission of the League of Nations: Neutral Observers after the September Eighteenth Incident Chen Haiyi (4)

After the September Eighteenth Incident, the League of Nations made slow progress in dealing with the Sino-Japanese conflict, one of the reasons being the lack of field information about Northeast China. China asked the League of Nations to send a commission to investigate facts, while Japan blocked it on the grounds of direct negotiations between China and Japan, but had to acquiesce that the third party personnel already in China and Japan could go to Northeast China to have observations. Prior to the formal dispatch of a commission by the League of Nations, the neutral observers of the Great Britain, United States and the League of Nations played the role of gathering information. The process of sending observers and the observation reports enabled the Great Britain, the United States and other parties to understand the Incident and promote the process of the League of Nations in dealing with the Sino-Japanese conflict. The dispatch of neutral observers not only alleviated the pressure on the League of Nations to obtain information on the ground, but also strengthened China's original intention of relying on the League of Nations, and prompted Japan to change its position on the dispatch of a commission of the League of Nations. The dispatch Neutral observers and the formation of the Commission of the League of Nations had inherent logical unity, being a preview of the Commission the League of Nations.

He Qigong and China College during Japanese Occupation of Peiping Yan Haijian (23)

After the outbreak of the total War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the Peiping Private China College persisted in running in the enemy-occupied areas. Under the rule of Japanese and puppet regimes, China College secretly maintained contact with the Chongqing Nationalist Government and received subsidies from the Ministry of Education. The Chongqing Nationalist Government also hoped to use financial supports to get the political loyalty of China College. At the same time, the College maintained cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party, and some teachers and students directly engaged in underground activities of fighting against Japanese aggressors. Under the rule of Japanese and puppet regimes, as a private college administrated by the Chinese people, China College was not taken over by the Japanese and puppet regimes, nor was forced to stop running, but rather continuously expanding its scale. When we look at the performance of He Qigong and China College in Peiping during the period, we should take into account the special living environments under the rule of Japanese and puppet regimes; most of their acts on the surface are strategic, and the actual behavior logics behind it are the keys to judge its nature. The reason why China College can obtain abnormal "development" is inseparable from the moral conscience and national identity of scholars in the enemy-occupied areas.

Teaching and Weidao: Lai Lian and the Governance of Northwestern Polytechnical College and Northwest University Chen Zhao (37)

The Duet of Rice Shortage and Rice Riots: Chengdu's Food Crisis in 1940 Chen Mo (50)

In 1940, the food problem in the Kuomintang-controlled area became more and more serious. The food crisis in Chengdu, which located in the core of the rear area, was manifested in the alternation of the "rice shortage" of soaring grain prices and the "rice riots" of the hungry people. The rise of rice price in Chengdu in the spring of 1940 was caused by inflation, poor harvest, hoarding and profiteering, and other factors, which led to the mass incidents of Chengdu hungry people smashing warehouses and robbing rice storage on 14th March. The Kuomintang Sichuan authorities temporarily quelled the riots by means of closing warehouses and selling stored grains, but did not delve into the causes and simply misjudged it as the instigation of the Chinese Communist Party's underground members. Over the next two months, the newly established Price Leveling Office had no enough strength to crack down on hoarding and failed to contain the rise of rice price. The sale of rice at affordable price was both short of rice and funds, and the cases of malpractice were incessant. These resulted in the rice price losing control again. The high temperature and less rain in Chengdu in early summer further catalyzed the rise in rice price and stimulated the long-brewing excessive emotions of the people. Both inside and outside Chengdu occurred the second riots of cutting grain bags, blocking passes, and charging rice markets, leading to social unrests. The development in waves of "rice shortage" and "rice riots" means the rapid deepening of the food crisis in

Chengdu. However, the careless omissions and mistakes of the Nationalist government in the process of disposal reflect the problems in its ruling logic and ability to deal with emergencies.

Wang Jingwei's Visit to Japan and the Internal Disputes in Japan in 1941 Zhang Zhan(68)

After recognizing the Wang Jingwei puppet government, the Japanese government, in order to reduce the war consumptions, decided to give priority to obtaining war resources in the occupied areas. This policy brought great practical pressure to the Wang puppet government. Wang Jingwei was eager to visit Japan and required the Japanese central government to adjust its policy towards Wang, but it was repeatedly rejected by the Japanese authorities. The main cause of Wang Jingwei's visit to Japan in 1941 was that Japanese military and political organs in China reached a consensus out of their own interests and jointly pressed the Japanese central government. This process also shows the complexity of internal interests competitions in Japan. The Japanese authorities decided to give Wang high-standard treatment, but did not make substantive adjustments to its policy. Wang Jingwei's visit to Japan eventually evolved from a political event expected by him into an ordinary ceremonial visit, which was also the result of a balance of disputes within Japan.

The Sino-British Negotiations around the Detention by the British-Myanmar authorities to the Foreign Loan Materials for China during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression Zuo Shuangwen, Ye Xin(81)

The Distribution, Reception and Use of Japan's Compensation Materials shipped to Shanghai after the World War II, 1947 – 1958 Xu Kun(99)

After the end of World War II, the Compensation Commission of the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist Government decided to accept Japanese compensation materials in advance and to bear the costs of transportation, storage, unloading and reloading. Facing multiple restrictions on funds, capacities and technologies, the Commission, with the help of concerned Ministries and Committees, reluctantly shipped all the first and second batches of Japanese compensation materials to Shanghai Port. However, after being handed over to the concerned units, they were unable to be repaired, reloaded and used. In 1949, when the Kuomintang's defeat was inevitable, it began to demolish and transfer compensation materials and even destroy materials that could not be transported away. With the liberation of Shanghai, the new established government began to take over the deployment, reloading and use of Japanese compensation materials. The government of the people's Republic of China made overall plans and effectively used these materials to concentrate on the development of the textile machinery manufacturing industry during the three-year economic recovery period, and to strengthen the iron and steel smelting and machinery manufacturing industries during the first five-year plan period.

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