



抗日战争研究

THE JOURNAL OF STUDIES OF CHINA'S RESISTANCE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

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In the context of the CPC endeavoring to advocate "criticism and self-criticism" during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the self-criticism meetings began to be main way for the leadership of the First Prefectural Committee of the CPC in the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Base to carry out the democratic life. During the rise and development of the Rectification Movement, the self-criticism meetings of the First Prefectural Committee appeared a tendency of "strictness," "politicization" and "externalization" in procedure, but it still maintained certain limits. At the same time, the self-criticism meetings of the First Prefectural Committee did not generally aim at all existing problems, but focusing on solving the problem of cadres' ideological backwardness and the relations between superiors and subordinates. So the meetings not only gradually became an important regular form for spiritual mobilization and promoted the ideological transformation of cadres, but also were helpful for the adjustment of the internal relations among cadres groups.

A Brief Analysis of Military Functions and Roles of the Staff Divisions of the CPC's Central Military Commission during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression

"The Party commands the gun" is the main military principle of the CPC. The development context of the Party's establishment of absolute leadership over the army is relatively clear, while the studies on the military functions and roles of the Party's military command agencies are opposite less. During the War of Resistance, with the development of the armed forces under the leadership of the CPC, the Party's military command had matured. The staff divisions of the Central Military Commission and military command functions of the headquarters at all levels under its jurisdiction were the operational basis of "the Party commands the gun." Through their subordinate departments, the staff divisions of the Central Military Commission provided references for the military decisions of the CPC's Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. At the same time, they guided the relevant works of headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army at all levels, ensuring the effective implementation of the Party's all military command decisions.

In order to meet the needs of national defense construction of resisting against Japan, the Bureau of Ordnance formulated *The Plan for Building New Arsenals* and began to reorganize the Army's military industry of the whole country. Following Yu Dawei's appointment as Director in 1933, the Bureau of Ordnance promoted accounting system for military industry, standardization of production and renovation of equipments, meanwhile it tried to build new arsenals with the help of the United States and Germany. In the process of the reorganization of whole country's Army, the Bureau of Ordnance focused on the production of infantry weapons and various types of ammunition urgently needed by the integrated units in the light of the production level of the arsenals directly under its jurisdiction and the actual needs of preparations for resisting against Japan. And it also enhanced the overall strength of the military industry through the construction of Zhuzhou Arsenal and reception of other local arsenals. Although the reorganization got some achievements and laid the foundation of military

production for protracted resistance in the future, it was interrupted by the outbreak of the Total War of Resistance and did not fundamentally change the backwardness of Chinese Army's military industry.

Adjustment and Evolution of the New Fourth Army's Resistance Strategy before the Frictions between the Kuomintang and the CPC in East Anhui Li Leibo (85)

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japan refused Wang Jingwei puppet regime to take part in the War on the pretext of avoiding to affect the Japanese-Soviet relations. But its actual consideration was focused on exclusively getting all rights and interests of Britain and the United States in China. After Japan received the concessions and other rights and interests, Wang Jingwei instructed Zhou Fohai, taking the opportunity of visiting in Japan, to ask the Japanese central government to allow the regime to take part in the War. However, Japan, worrying that the issue would affect Japan's peace with the Nationalist government, put it on hold. With the evolution of the Pacific War, Japan's plan of attacking Chongqing and forcing the Nationalist government to yield was suspended. At the same time, Britain and the United States had announced the abolition of all unequal treaties imposed on China. In order to fighting back through propaganda, winning the Chinese people's support and getting it off the hook of invading China, Japan launched a "new policy towards China." Japan believed that the unjustified change of its China policy would easily give people a sense of weakness, so it decided to take the policy as a "reward" to Wang Jingwei puppet regime's participation in the War. As a result the regime won Japan's approval to participate in the War, and this gave Japan an out to launch the "new policy towards China." The process of Wang Jingwei puppet regime's participation in the War clearly shows Japan's policy decision towards the regime, that is, how to make flexible use of Wang Jingwei puppet regime to maximize Japan's own interests; and how Wang Jingwei puppet regime with no abilities to play game put forward its own demands under the premise of obeying Japan, which is also worthy of attention.

The Sino-British Negotiations on the Issue of Joint Defense of Burma, 1940 - 1942

In October 1940, after the reopening of the Burma Road, China actively planned to send troops to Burma to maintain the safety of international traffic. However, Britain, unwilling to intervene in the Sino-Japanese War and seeking to defend the Far East colonies on its own merits and with its own strength, had repeatedly prevented Chinese troops from going to Burma. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, because of the British-Burmese government was unable to provide sufficient logistical support to Chinese troops in Burma, while China was unable to change the allies' understanding of its international status because of its limited strength, the Burma's defense lost its favorable opportunity for second time. In the end, under the serious circumstances the British agreed China to send troops to Burma. In the process of negotiating with Britain, China met a series of twists and turns. This was the practical difficulty that China faced along with the Sino-Japanese War entering the stage of internationalization from stage of China fighting Japanese invaders alone, and it was also the inevitable result of the interweaving of the existing contradictions and conflicts of strategic interests among allied countries.

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