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# 世界经济与政治

WORLD ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

大国崛起中“以经稳政”的  
限度、空间和效力

高 程 部彦君

“无声的协调”：大国在中亚的  
互动模式新探

曾向红

国际经济议程政治化与世界贸易组织  
改革困境

徐秀军 林凯文



中国社会科学院  
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## 世界政治

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## Abstracts

### **The Limits, Space and Effectiveness of “Stabilizing Policy Through Economy” in the Rise of Great Powers: Reflection and Reconstruction of the Theory of “Economic Ballast Stone”**

**Gao Cheng Bu Yanjun (4)**

[Abstract] The current competition between great powers makes their close economic interdependence unable to protect their political relations under certain circumstances and may even make it become the “fuse” of conflicts between them. This paper aims to explore the limits, space and effectiveness of the “stabilizing policy by economy” adopted by the rising powers when the rising powers and hegemonic powers are entering the stage of strategic competition, and then put forward an analytical framework for the “economic ballast stone” theory. It tries to examine the logic behind the behavior of countries through analyzing the cases of typical countries and summarize the situations in which the “ballast stone” fails or even backfires when a rising power faces relations with three types of countries: The first is the relationship between a rising power and the hegemonic power in the stage of strategic competition, the second is the relationship between a rising power and a regional power when regional dominance shifts or weakens, and the third is the relationship between a rising power and a hegemon’s close supporter that is highly consistent with the values of the hegemonic power. Between a rising country and a country that has only territorial disputes with it, the effectiveness of the “economic ballast stone” is higher than in these three situations, and there is particular room for “stabilizing procedure through economy” or even “promoting policy through economy”. For most countries in the world, China still has much room to continue its strategic economic diplomacy, and the effect of “promoting policy through economy” is noticeable. By comparing the bilateral economic and trade relations between Britain and Germany before and after the outbreak of the First World War, as well as the different roles China currently plays in its relations with the United States, India, Australia and most of its neighboring countries, it is possible to test the limit and validity of the role of the “stabilizing policy through economy” in

the process of the rise of great powers. and provides a policy reference for China's economic diplomacy.

【Key Words】the rise of great powers, economic interdependence, economic ballast stone, stabilizing policy through economy, promoting policy through economy

【Authors】Gao Cheng, Professor at the School at International Politics and Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Senior Fellow at Latin American Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Bu Yanjun, Ph.D. Candidate at School of Politics and International Relations, Tongji University.

### **“Silent Coordination”: A New Study About the Interaction Model of Great Powers in Central Asia**

**Zeng Xianghong (42)**

【Abstract】Since the independence of Central Asian countries, it is interesting to note that a number of major powers have been involved in Central Asian affairs without causing significant unrest in the region. It is believed that this is related to the coexistence of explicit cooperation and the interaction models of “silent coordination” among great powers in Central Asia. Explicit cooperation mainly exists between actors such as the EU and the United States, Russia and China, and “silent coordination” is generally reflected in the daily interactions of many great powers. So far, the significance of “silent coordination” for stabilizing the situation in Central Asia has not received sufficient attention. As a matter of fact, “silent coordination” is a tacit “cooperation” formed by great powers following “hidden rules” in Central Asia through long-term exploration and interaction. The “silent coordination” carried out by extraterritorial powers in Central Asia is mainly reflected in four aspects, namely, abiding by the four “hidden rules”: the unanimous recognition of the sovereignty of Central Asian countries, the tacit recognition of Russia's special status in Central Asia, the respect for the diversified and balanced foreign policy pursued by Central Asian countries, and the promotion of peace and stability in Central Asia. The formation of the interaction model of “silent coordination” is closely related to the multiple duality characteristics of the geographical environment of Central Asia, the specific power structure and mentality structure formed by great powers in Central Asia, and the active cooperation of great powers with the Central Asian countries in pursuing their foreign policy objec-

tives. Given the high stability of the above factors, the “silent coordination” of great powers in Central Asia will have its continuity.

【Key Words】five Central Asian countries, “new great game”, “silent coordination”, “hidden rules”, regional governance

【Author】Zeng Xianghong, Professor at Institute for Central Asian Studies and School of Politics and International Relations, Lanzhou University.

### **Reinventing the Leviathan: Great Power Competition and the Building of the American Developmental State**

**Liu Luxin (71)**

【Abstract】After the Second World War, driven by three different types of great power competition, the United States has undertaken several rounds of state-building in the economic sphere, thus taking great strides to evolve from a “night-watchman state” to a “developmental state” with American characteristics. The US-Soviet security competition led to the emergence of a security-oriented domestic coalition centered on the Department of Defense; the US-Japan economic competition gave rise to a development-oriented domestic coalition centered on the Department of Commerce. Both domestic coalitions sought to increase dominance over the US high-tech industries, but the power clash between them had given the US developmental state a decentralized and hidden character. It was not until the second decade of the 21st century, when the US came under dual competitive pressure from China on both the economic and security fronts, that the security-oriented and the development-oriented coalitions came together to promote the rise of a more visible and convergent developmental state in the US. In contrast to the East Asian developmental states that aimed at economic catch-up, this American developmental state aims to assert global hegemony and possesses strong state capacity in economic diplomacy to intervene in the international market. The study also shows that the US has constantly adapted its state-market relations in respond to external competition pressures, and that the traditional definition of the US as a “free market economy” and a “weak state” is only an academic “myth” that needs to be re-examined.

【Key Words】great power competition, American state building, night-watchman state, developmental state, political coalition

【Author】Liu Luxin, Assistant Professor at School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

### **Politicization of the International Economic Agenda and the World Trade Organization Reform Dilemma**

**Xu Xijun Lin Kaiwen (101)**

【Abstract】In recent years, with the prevalence of global protectionism, the trend of politicization of the international economic agenda has intensified, and the operation and development of international economic mechanisms are thus facing unprecedented challenges. As the most important multilateral trade governance mechanism in the world today, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has played an irreplaceable and important role in promoting global openness and cooperation, but now its function has been seriously hampered. Although all members are committed to promoting the WTO modernization, there are unbridgeable differences in positions on specific issues, and the reform of the WTO is in a difficult position to move forward. From the perspective of international agenda-setting analysis, due to the embedding of political issues and spillover of economic issues, the selection and definition of issues in the reform of the WTO are increasingly politicized. The embedding of political issues expands the political function of WTO and makes WTO's agenda touch on the political field that requires more members' relationship. The spillover of economic issues leads to the relevant issues out of the consideration of economic benefits, which makes it more difficult to reach a consensus. In the context of growing competition and even confrontation between the major powers, the political nature of the WTO reform agenda has been increasing, and the tendency to instrumentalize and weaponize the agenda setting has become more pronounced, making it more difficult for members to reach a consensus on reform. In this regard, it is necessary for members to promote the reform of the WTO to eliminate the interference of various political factors, promote the depoliticization of the agenda setting, and return the reform of the WTO to the position and function as an international economic mechanism.

【Key Words】international agenda setting, politicization of economic agenda, the World Trade Organization, reform dilemma

【Authors】Xu Xijun, Professor at the School of International Politics and Economics,

University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Lin Kaiwen, Master's Student at the School of International Politics and Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

### **The Construction of an Evaluation System on the Binding Force of International Treaties**

**Zhao Xuefei (130)**

**[Abstract]** Signing international treaties is an important manifestation of inter-state cooperation, and with the cross-disciplinary development of various disciplines, the details of treaty text design have gradually become a focal point of treaty binding research. Based on the rational choice theory in the new institutionalism, a treaty binding force evaluation system containing five dimensions of membership, scope, centralization, control and flexibility is constructed by examining the treaty text, and the evaluation system is verified by using the calculation methods of text analysis and entropy method with the maritime cooperation treaties signed by China and ASEAN. It is calculated that the control degree indicator of multilateral treaties and the flexibility degree indicator of bilateral treaties within the sample have shown higher weights, which is consistent with the hypothesis that there are binding differences between bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties. In addition, the average of the binding force of multilateral treaties in the sample tends to increase year by year and the difference tends to decrease year by year, while the average of the binding force of bilateral treaties tends to decrease year by year since 2000 and the difference of treaties tends to decrease year by year. The construction of the international treaty binding force evaluation system is of certain application value for the study of treaty design characteristics among different fields and countries, as well as the examination of the binding force changes of the same type of treaties signed by countries.

**[Key Words]** international treaties, binding force evaluation, international maritime cooperation, the Belt and Road Initiative, China-ASEAN relations

**[Author]** Zhao Xuefei, Ph.D. Candidate at the Research School for Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University.



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