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# 外交评论

FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW

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技术权力、技术生命周期与大国的技术政策选择

大众地缘政治想象中的身份政治与“他者”形象  
西方对中国的“污名化”及其应对：框架理论的视角



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# 外交评论

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# FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW

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## **Global Ocean Governance and Building a Maritime Community with a Shared Future**

*LU Jing*

**Abstract:** As the strategic situation of the world ocean undergoes profound changes, geopolitical rivalry among maritime powers becomes increasingly intense, and the “tragedy of commons” at sea more and more apparent. It is against such background that China puts forward the proposal to build a maritime community with a shared future, which, affluent in connotation, is composed of a security community, a development community, and a community of shared responsibilities. To build a maritime community with a shared future meets the need of developing maritime civilization of our time, and provides China’s solution to hard problems in global ocean governance. Nonetheless, building a maritime community with a shared future faces many challenges, such as international society’s knowledge deficit, dualistic maritime order, geopolitical rivalry, and so on. China should pay special attention to knowledge and discourse development, and institutionalization in the process of the community building so as to build a collaborative governance structure featuring pluralism.

**Key words:** maritime community with a shared future, global ocean governance, geopolitical rivalry among maritime powers, multilateralism, collaborative governance

## **Decoding the U. S. Hegemony in the Semiconductor Industry: Conceptualizing the Political Economy of Industrial Power**

*LI Wei LI Yuyi*

**Abstract:** Since it created the semiconductor industry to meet the needs of the military in the mid-20th century, the United States has long been the world leader in this field. From the 1980s onwards, as semiconductor technology gradually spread around the world, East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan also emerged to change the industry's landscape from "one-man show" to "hundred flowers in blossom". However, the recent U. S. strong suppression of Chinese high-tech companies, especially Huawei, has revealed that the U. S. still possesses absolute hegemonic power in the semiconductor industry, measured mainly by industrial control rather than industrial competitiveness, despite the highly globalized division of labor and the relative decline of the U. S. domestic manufacturing. The U. S. "chip war" against China on an unprecedented scale has produced not only a significant negative impact on the development of related enterprises, but also a serious obstacle to the upgrading of China's entire Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry, underscoring the enormous industrial power of the U. S. Such industrial power stems from its strong control over three parts of the semiconductor industry; the technology chain, the financial chain and the consumer chain. The U. S. control has not been weakened by the decline of its industrial competitiveness. Specifically, the U. S. controls core technologies and high-end research and development in key segments of the industrial chain, and major semiconductor companies in terms of financing channels and equity structures. Moreover, as the world's largest buyer of semiconductor products, the U. S. controls the market. Technology control, financial control and market control together constitute the three cornerstones of U. S. hegemony in the semiconductor industry, which in turn ensures that the U. S. retains strong industrial power despite its relative decline in industrial competitiveness. Hopefully, this three-dimensional analysis framework based on technology-

capital-market could shed light on the rise and strategic breakthrough of China's semiconductor industry against the odds.

**Key words:** semiconductor, industrial power, technology control, financial control, market control, chip, political economy

## **Technological Power, Technology Life Cycle and Technology Policy Choices of Great Powers**

*ZHANG Qianyu*

**Abstract:** Technology competition among major powers refers to the process in which state actors adopt various technology policies to compete for technological power. Technological power can be categorized as compulsory power, network power and institutional power. Technology competition is often a long-term interactive process that may cover one or more technology life cycles. Different kinds of technological power appear at different stages of a technology life cycle, and technological power accumulation may be continued or interrupted in the alternating period between two technology life cycles. Therefore, at different stages of technology life cycle, the policy choices of competitors will change accordingly with the change in technological power. The competition among the United States, Russia, China and Europe on GNSS, and the competition among the United States, Europe, Japan and China from 2G to 5G have both clearly shown the factors of willingness (power acquisition) that drove them into technology competition and corresponding policy choices. While the former only involves a single technology life cycle, the latter contains more than one. China is a major player in current technology competition. To remain invincible, China should adhere to independent innovation and opening-up policies, pay attention to the characteristics of different stages of technological development, take measures in accordance with the current stage on the one hand, and prepare for the following stage in advance on the other.

**Key words:** technology competition, technological power, technology life cycle, technology policy choices, GNSS, ICT

## **Identity Politics and the “Other” Image in the Popular Geopolitical Imagination: A Case Study of the Mutually Constructed Images in Popular Culture Between the U. S. and Russia (USSR)**

*GE Jingshen*

**Abstract:** The geopolitical myths created by popular culture directly shape the imagination of specific communities about the image of other nations, and profoundly affect national identity, foreign policy, and international relations. In the postmodern military-industrial-media-entertainment network, popular culture products transmit the geopolitical imagination of political elites to the public on the one hand, and feed popular geopolitical imagination in popular discourse to policy makers on the other. The ways in which popular culture products shape the “Other” are multifaceted. The mechanisms of generating the image of the “Other” in the popular geopolitical imagination mainly include dehumanization, spectacle-making and gender-role assignment. The entertainment industry in the west tends to rely on some fixed templates to mass-produce typified “Others” in order to maintain the stability of “Self”. It is an important part of the western soft power while its dissemination process is covert and often does not receive an immediate response from geopolitical opponents. Today’s popular geopolitics is still largely west-centered. While western popular culture has achieved commercial success in the process of global dissemination, it has covertly spread the geopolitical imagination hidden in it. Therefore, in the international competition for discourse, China must fully recognize the geopolitical function of popular culture, and pay attention to the construction of popular culture and Chinese narrative.

**Key words:** popular geopolitics, geopolitical imagination, popular culture, identity politics, “Other” image, U. S. -Russia Relation

## **The “Stigmatization” of China and Its Response: A Perspective of Frame Theory**

*WANG Cuimei*

**Abstract:** While striving to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, China has also made important contributions to promoting the common development of the world. However, the wave of stigmatizing China set off by the West has kept rising. Stigmatization is a negative construction of the image of a specific individual or group by the stigmatizer for a specific purpose under the shadow of public opinion. The stigmatizer’s framing is the key to understanding the process of stigmatization. The audience’s frame resonance is the basic index for the evaluation of the impact of stigmatization. And the stigmatized’s counter-framing is an important measure in the fight against stigmatization. The “stigmatization” of China has been conducted by the West mainly through framing: framing China’s image as “the other” and its “threat” to the west-dominated international order and employing a variety of negative China-related discourses to incite the international community to jointly put China down. Although such framing lacks credibility, it has seriously damaged China’s international image, and could even endanger China’s core national interests. In a time of profound global changes, as international attention to what China says and does continues to grow, the west may put more efforts into stigmatizing China. China should be prepared for a long-term fight against stigmatization, expose the parochialism of such framing, advance the construction of Chinese discourse and narrative system, and enhance China’s capacity-building for international communication.

**Key words:** stigmatization, frame theory, the image of the other, discourse framing, Chinese international image, international order

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